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THE INCREASING ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS
IN INVESTMENT TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Mark Kantor*
I would like to welcome you to our panel on the Increasing Role of Interest
Groups in Investment Transactions Involving International Financial
Institutions. Our objective today is to discuss the growing impact on
international investment transactions of local and international interest groups-
organizations such as business associations, consumer, environmental and
human rights groups, community activists and labor associations. As will
become apparent from the presentations, the role of interest groups has grown
in parallel with the increased participation of international financial institutions
(IFIs) as financing sources for these investments. Our panel will focus on
individual projects in which IFIs participate, not (as other panels are addressing
during this conference) on the impact of interest groups on change within the
institutional frameworks of those financial institutions.
For many years, multilateral development organizations like the World
Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank focused their efforts on the public sector. Indeed, the
Articles of Agreement of the World Bank limit World Bank loans and
guarantees solely to public sector entities. Since the early 1990s, however,
multilateral institutions have become important contributors to the financing of
private sector investments in emerging markets. The International Finance
Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency have led this
reorientation within the World Bank Group, and the World Bank itself has
placed a carefully circumscribed toe in the waters of privately financed
infrastructure though its partial-risk guarantee program and through sector
adjustment loans intended to assist privatizations. Faced with fewer charter
constraints, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank also moved in the mid-nineties to provide direct debt and equity support
for private sector projects in areas considered central to economic and social
development in member countries.
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National governments also refocused their financial support in the 1990s
towards the private sector in emerging markets, particularly to support
purchases of goods and services exported from their own markets. National
export credit agencies (ECAs) such as United States Eximbank, CoFACE,
ECGD, JBIC and Hermes and investment promotion agencies such as the
United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) have become
substantial providers of guarantee and loan assistance to privately owned
infrastructure projects and other investments in emerging market economies.
The participation of multilateral and national IFls in private direct
investment transactions has carried with it an increasing voice for local and
international interest groups in those transactions. The growing role of interest
groups is not surprising in hindsight. Multilateral financial institutions have
been under great pressure to open their own processes to these groups, as have
ECAs in various countries. The involvement of an IFI in a private transaction
creates a natural platform for interest groups to seek a more forceful role in
structuring and implementing the investment.
Examples of recent investment transactions in which interest groups are
playing prominent roles abound. For example, the Chad-Cameroon petroleum
development and pipeline project has achieved considerable attention, as
environmental and development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
community groups have challenged the role of the World Bank, the European
Investment Bank and several ECAs in providing support for the project.
The Chad-Cameroon project is a $3.5 billion oil field development and oil
pipeline project to develop the Doba oilfields in southern Chad and transport the
oil by means of a 1070 km pipeline to a marine terminal at Kribi on the Atlantic
coast of Cameroon. The project was approved by the World Bank in June 2000,
but remains mired at this time in controversy over a number of issues, including
the alleged diversion towards arms purchases by Chad of part of an initial
payment by the project sponsors. The principal international sponsors are
Exxon Mobil, Petronas and Chevron, and both Chad and Cameroon will also
participate as equity investors in the project. The World Bank and the European
Investment Bank propose to lend approximately $115 million to these
governments to finance acquisition of the equity interests. In addition, about
thirty-seven percent of the cost of constructing the project will be raised as loans
from IFIs or in the commercial bank debt markets, with virtually all of that
indebtedness covered by political risk or comprehensive support provided by
ECAs or funded directly by IFIs.
The World Bank also anticipates providing loans of $17.5 million to Chad
and $5.77 million to Cameroon to finance "capacity-building" for the purpose
of enabling those governments to maintain adequate oversight of the project and
its effect on the affairs of the host country. The International Development
Association (IDA), the World Bank's lending arm for the poorest countries, will
provide further capacity-building support of $23.7 million and $5.8 million,
respectively, in equivalent credits. The impact on Chad will be especially
pronounced. As the World Bank has stated, "Chad's capacity weakness is of
particular concern. This weakness is all-encompassing and greater than in most
sub-Saharan countries, reflecting the impact of almost three decades of civil
strife.... ." Once revenues commence, the project could bring Chad revenues
of about $200 million each year for the next quarter-century, resulting in a
doubling of the country's budget. The capacity-building loans are intended to
finance the building of the institutional capability within the two governments
to effectively absorb and allocate the large anticipated in-flows. Taking
together all forms of IFI assistance, official credit support is thus directly
necessary for raising about forty percent of all project costs, and additional
World Bank loans are financing reforms to mitigate the adverse impact of the
projected flood of revenues on weak government institutions in the host
countries.
Local and international NGOs have criticized the proposed oil field and
pipeline project severely for a number of reasons and in a number of forums.
Environmental and social objections include concerns over the loss of
livelihoods and resettlement of rural peoples; loss of biodiversity; the impact of
leaks from underground pipelines; and the impact on coastal areas of a heavily-
trafficked marine terminal. Broader criticisms include the risks to Chad and
Cameroon of relying on oil production to fuel development, the risks of non-
transparency and corruption resulting from large flows of hard currency into
destitute economies, the potential for re-igniting the civil war in Chad and the
clash between "traditional peasant culture and the expatriate oil business way
of life." 2 As broad as these criticisms may be, the range of organizations raising
these questions and criticisms has been equally broad, including over eighty
local and international NGOs. Those NGOs have employed several platforms
to encourage debate over these issues: formal presentations to the World Bank,
the European Investment Bank and those ECAs with organized program for
public comment; open letters to the World Bank and others; lobbying
campaigns aimed at national government representatives to the World Bank or
aimed at Western legislators; a sustained campaign to bring media attention to
bear on the project; and flooding of the sponsors, the financial advisor and
1. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report No. 19427-CD, Project
Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 12.6 Million. (USD 17.5 Million
Equivalent). The Government of Chad for Management of the Petroleum Economy Project, at 3 (December
29, 1999), downloadable at http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited May 17, 2001).
2. See generally Korinna Horta, Questions Concerning The World Bank and Chad/Cameroon Oil
and Pipeline Project. Makings of a New Ogoniland? Corporate Welfare Disguised as Aid to the Poor?,
available at http:/Avww.edf.org (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
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various public organizations with mail and e-mail messages objecting to the
project.
As a consequence of this clamor, a number of actions occurred. Two
original sponsors, Shell and ELF, withdrew from the project amid speculation
that the strong opposition to the project influenced their decisions. The pipeline
location itself was modified significantly. A host of local consultation meetings
occurred. Faced with criticism of its own procedures in approving the project,
as well as the impact of the project on the host countries, the Bank determined
to establish an International Advisory Group (lAG) that would monitor
implementation of the project, although disagreements between NGOs and the
Bank still exist over membership on the lAG and the Terms of Reference for the
panel.
Of special importance, the World Bank, the host governments and the
project also structured a system of controls over project disbursements and
revenues intended to assure future transparency in the use by Chad and
Cameroon of those monies. For example, under the revenue management
program for Chad, the government of Chad has agreed to an extraordinary level
of extra-governmental involvement in control over its portion of project
revenues. Petroleum revenue from the project will be channeled through the
project's audited offshore accounts and ninety percent of Chad's portion of that
revenue (once released to Chad by the project company) will be transferred to
special accounts of the Chad Treasury maintained at two designated commercial
banks acceptable to the World Bank. Disbursements from those accounts will
only be made in accordance with pre-agreed development objectives set out in
the revenue management program and approved by the Chad Parliament, and
must be reviewed in advance by an Oversight Committee composed of
representatives of the Chad Government, the Chad Parliament, a local NGO and
a trade union representative. The Oversight Committee will issue quarterly
reports and all audits and reports of the Oversight Committee will be published.
The special accounts will be audited by auditors acceptable to, and with terms
of reference agreed by, the World Bank, and the World Bank and the IMF will
conduct periodic joint expenditure reviews. A separate investment fund
covering the remaining ten percent of Chad's project revenues will be subject
to similar auditing and oversight arrangements, as well as investment criteria
pre-agreed with the World Bank. These control and audit procedures were
established by means of legislation enacted by the Chad Parliament, not merely
contracts and government decrees, to maximize support across all political
institutions. The commitment of the government of Chad to the principles
underlying these procedures, however, has been called into controversy by the
alleged diversion to military expenditures of a portion of a twenty-seven million
advance payment, even though the procedures have yet to be put into place.
I have handed out an excerpt from ExxonMobil's project web page
summarizing the scope of public consultation by the Chad-Cameroon project
with local communities, local and international NGOs and resulting actions.3
NGOs, though, continue to criticize the project's consultation process as
inadequate. Regardless of one's personal view of the project or the efficacy of
its consultative process, the twenty-two pages from this excerpt demonstrate that
a large quantity of project time, resources and planning has been devoted toward
addressing the issues raised as a result of the activities of the NGOs, community
activists and the media. The impact of interest groups on the time and resources
of the project, its private sector participants and the IFIs is apparent. Moreover,
this short summary also illustrates the leverage for NGOs created by IFI
involvement in the project. It is hard to imagine such a process for a petroleum
project just 10-15 years ago.
In addition to focusing on individual investment transactions, of course,
these interest groups are also engaged in active lobbying and negotiating
campaigns to dramatically change the institutional frameworks of IFIs. It is
very difficult to draw a conceptual line between the pressure on IFIs to
institutionally accommodate interest group concerns and the pressure on
individual IFI-supported investments to restructure themselves in response to
interest group concerns. Lobbying for institutional change is, of course,
intended to result in changes in how IFIs treat individual projects, and lobbying
about individual projects will necessarily carve new channels within the
institutions that result in institutional changes as well as changes to the targeted
projects. There is, however, a very practical difference. The practicing bar,
particularly private sector lawyers, are finding the day-to-day activities of their
clients in individual investment transactions are being affected by these interest
groups, and therefore the nature of the work undertaken by project participants
is beginning to change in a significant fashion. These investors now develop
environmental impact, community development and public affairs programs as
essential components of their project development activities.
Why are these changes occurring now? First, as the Chad-Cameroon story
illustrates, the direct participation of IFIs in the financing of individual private
sector investments creates formal and informal platforms for NGO involvement
that did not previously exist. As IFIs continue to shift their attention toward
promoting the private sector in weak economies, the opportunities for interest
groups to use IFI leverage will continue to grow.
Another development in international economic relations is also likely to
accelerate the involvement of NGOs in individual transactions. The web of
international agreements on commercial matters now extends far beyond the
3. Chapter 9, Public Consultation Process and Results, available athttp://www.essochad.com/eaff
/essochad/documentation/summary/9.html (last visited Mar. 17. 2001).
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purchase and sale of goods and services, and related tariff and non-tariff
barriers. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) and
the investment-related provisions of NAFTA are examples of increased
multilateral involvement in individual investment transactions. Although
neither the WTO dispute settlement understanding nor NAFTA dispute
resolution procedures permit direct NGO intervention in disputes over breaches
of TRIMS or NAFTA commitments, NGOs are increasingly adept at pressing
national governments to incorporate interest group views into positions taken
by those governments on those disputes. And pressure continues to grow for
direct participation of NGOs in dispute procedures under those agreements.
Three recent NAFTA disputes, one involving issues of environmental licensing
in Mexico, the second claiming expropriation in light of a large award of
punitive damages by a Mississippi jury in civil litigation and the third seeking
damages for the ban by California of the gasoline additive MTBE, have
highlighted for many United States activists the importance of finding a means
of participating in NAFTA dispute proceedings involving individual
investments."
More generally, the provisions in NAFTA and the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), and subsidiary understandings such as the Reference
Paper on Telecommunications Services, requiring Member States to maintain
transparency, impartial administrative tribunals and review of such matters as
tariff and pricing, anti-competitive conduct of certain service monopolies and
the like encourage the development of host government institutions accessible
to NGOs as well. For example, to head off a United States complaint to the
WTO that Mexico has violated GATS telecommunications commitments by
permitting the former public telecoms monopoly, Telnex, to charge high
interconnection tariffs, the Mexican government has proposed among other
matters to make available additional resources to COFETEL, Mexico's
telecommunications regulatory agency. This GATS-encouraged enhancement
of the resources and independence of a national regulatory agency should result
in the growth of another forum for interest group involvement in decisions (in
this case, the pricing of telephone services and the availability of consumer
choices) affecting individual telecommunications investments.
Further, notions of privatization are deeply affecting the structure of
international investments in emerging markets. Many high-profile privatization
transactions of public infrastructure or sensitive industries now combine private
and public participants in transactions that politicians and public affairs
4. Metalclad v. United Mexican States, available at http://www.naftalaw.orgi metalclad.pdf (last
visited Mar. 17, 2001), R. Loewen and Loewen Corp. v. United States of America, available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Mar. 17, 2001), and Methanex Corporation v. United States of
America, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2001).
specialists fondly call "public-private partnerships." The participation of private
investors and public authorities in the same transaction assures the interest of
local and international groups in the public sector decision-making process
regarding the project. As public and private participants become intertwined
within the confines of a single project, interest group access to the public sector
parties creates opportunities for NGO access to decisions made by the private
sector participants as well.
The impact of interest groups on individual investment transactions will
only increase over the next decade, as these groups gain experience in using
newly provided platforms and in mobilizing attention and resources to focus on
particular projects. By way of illustration, the International Program of Friends
of the Earth, a prominent and aggressive environmental protection organization,
includes ten staffers (underpaid as they may be) following the environmental
impact of individual IFI-supported investment project worldwide. Accordingly,
the day-to-day activities of the private sector participants in these projects, and
their counsel, are rapidly changing to address the defacto involvement of new
parties in structuring the project.
Let me now introduce our panelists to continue to explore these issues.
Barry Metzer is a partner with Coudert Brothers and former General Counsel of
Asian Development Bank. Barry has extensive experience with international
projects and investments, both as a result of his many years at Coudert Brothers
and as a result of his service at the Asian Development Bank. Jon Sohn, our
second panelist, is an International Policy Analyst/I Campaigner at Friends
of the Earth, where he focuses on international financial institutions, primarily
ECAs, such as OPIC and US Eximbank. He was formerly Counsel and
Environmental Program Officer at OPIC. Amelia (Amy) Porges, our third
speaker, is Of Counsel at Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, where she
focuses on international business matters. Before joining Powell Goldstein, Ms.
Porges was Senior Counsel for Dispute Settlement at the Office of the United
States Trade Representative. Please join me in welcoming our panelists.
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